INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the first important GNSS signal distortion due to a payload failure was observed on GPS L1 C/A [4] . This raised two important questions among user communities , and more particularly the civil aviation community: Which signal distortions could affect a GPS L1 C/A signal in a hazardous way? How is it possible to protect a user against this threat? More precisely, distortions of interest were called Evil Waveforms (EWF) and were initially defined as signal distortions which could entail a large error on a differential user without being detected. The investigations consisted in considering all signal distortions leading to dangerous correlation function deformations (asymmetry , false peak and dead zones) [3] . The underlying reason for this is that correlation function distortions can be mapped into DLL, and thus pseudorange, biases. A proposition of signal distortion types with such consequences on the correlation function was made in 1999 for GPS L1 C/A [5] . This proposition has been adopted by ICAO with the definition of three Threat Models (TM) [3] : -TM-A which is associated to a failure in the navigation data unit (NDU), the digital part of a satellite. It consists in considering the positive chips of the GPS L1 C/A PRN signal with a falling edge that leads or lags, by a delay noted ∆, relative to the theoretically correct end-time for that chip.
-TM-B which introduces amplitude modulation and models degradations in the analogue section of a satellite. More specifically, it consists of the output of a second order system when the nominal C/A code baseband signal is the input. Two parameters are defined to characterize this threat model: the damping factor σ and the ringing frequency .
-TM-C which is a combination of the two previous failures.
These models are based on modelling possible phenomenon occurring at the satellite level. They do not necessarily represent the reality but are approaching expected signal distortions which could appear on a GPS L1 C/A signal. In fact, these threat models, and their associated parameter ranges, referred to as Threat Space, are powerful and necessary tools to design and test performances of Signal Quality Monitor (SQM), which is in charge, in some augmentation systems, of detecting dangerous distortions . This signal monitoring is necessary to protect users with high requirements in terms of integrity, accuracy, availability, and continuity such as civil aviation users. Nowadays, this monitoring task is performed in SBAS and GBAS systems.
This document describes a general concept to define Threat Models for Galileo signals and the associated Threat Space for Galileo E1C and Galileo E5a. Considering these two signals and an E-L tracking, it appears that correlation function threats are identical to threats defined for GPS L1 C/A: false peak, dead zone and asymmetry. Indeed, tracking techniques are similar and the shape of the correlation function on the tracked area is comparable (triangular shape) for all studied modulations. However, the way to translate it at the signal level is not straightforward due to the different modulation used by Galileo signals and the different payload architecture: -TM-B can be easily applied to every GNSS signals by representing the effect of the analogue section of a satellite by a second order filter. The method consists in using the current second order filter and aims to find a limit for parameters range ( and σ). -TM-A is more difficult to adapt in a generic way to all GNSS signals with sub-carrier components (CBOC((6,1,1/ 11) for example). Indeed, the lead/lag specified for the GPS L1 C/A TM-A could affect code chip transition and/or sub-chip transition as well.
-
To finish, a TM-C, combination of TM-A and TM-B is envisaged.
This paper proposes a conservative way to established TM (TM-A, TM-B and TM-C) for Galileo E1C and Galileo E5a. These TM propositions are based on two key notions which are: -The consequences on receivers (user and reference) of distortions included in the Threat Space.
The model of the distortions. In this document, the ICAO TM defined for GPS L1 C/A is applied on Galileo signals.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS TO LIMIT TM PARAMETERS RANGE

Concept
EWF are defined as signal distortions that are caused by a satellite anomaly. As a matter of fact, knowledge about payload components and payload behavior in a faulty case could be sufficient to define EWF. Nevertheless, due to the lack of information about the way payload components could fail and their impact on signal generation, only distortion models (second order ringing phenomenon and lead/lag at positive chips signal falling edges) are defined from payload considerations. Others criteria have to be introduced to establish Threat Model limits.
Criteria used to define the Threat Space, ie the possible values of the TM-B parameters ( and ) and TM-A parameter (Δ), for GPS L1 C/A signal are quickly described in [5] : For the TM-B:  It is mentioned that the higher bound for (17 MHz,) has been chosen because higher frequency ringing effects would be filtered out by the satellite RF output filter, which is 20. Because of the lack of knowledge about payload behavior in a faulty condition, it is assumed in this document that the distortion model is the same for Galileo E1C and Galileo E5a than for GPS L1 C/A. It means that the analogue failure consists on the output of a second order system [3] whereas a lead/lag on falling signal transitions (whether chip or sub-chip) characterizes a digital failure.
However, regarding Threat Space limits, some differences appear compared to the study realized on GPS L1 C/A. Indeed, to establish all parameters' limits (TM-A and TM-B), two quantities are evaluated in order to simplify the definition of the Threat Space: -The impact of a distortion on a receiver working with differential corrections. More precisely, a parameter limitation is established on the analysis of the consequences of a distortion on a differential user's corrected pseudorange measurement. This analysis is based on the use of all possible civil aviation airborne receiver configurations (essentially different correlator spacings RF front-end filter bandwidths and RF front-end filter types) and the knowledge of the reference station settings to cover the largest number of possible cases and the worst case. If a distortion leads to small differential bias (smaller than a specified maximu m differential error: ∆ _ ) for all considered user/reference configurations, the corresponding TM parameters can be removed fro m the Threat Space.
-
The impact of a distortion on a reference receiver.
More precisely, if a signal distortion leads to reference tracking bias higher than a specified limit, the distortion is not included in the Threat Space because detected by the ground segment (regarding a and a probabilities). Today, no such requirement on the tracking error detection at the reference level is defined. However, such strong hypothesis is useful to limit the Threat Space. It is presumed that the reference station is able to detect an absolute tracking bias higher than 20 meters with another process than the Signal Quality Monitor. Nowadays no algorith m exists to perform this task but it is assumed in this document that in the future such detectors will be provided. The value of 20 meters is chosen to be reachable and conservative.
Selected Reference and User Configurations
A user-oriented approach is used to determine the Threat Space. This approach results in the fact that the TM is dependent on the user and reference station configurations, and notably on the following parameters : -The tracking technique (including the local replica) -
The correlator spacing -The RF front-end (technology, bandwidth, maximu m group delay variation).
Values and information about these parameters are given 
∆ _ Value
This parameter is of primary importance because it represents the limit of the acceptable differential error in presence of EWF. Signal distortions which entail smaller differential errors than this limit are not included in the TM. The smaller ∆ _ is , the wider the Threat Space is .
∆ _ is defined in a noise-free configuration. This follows the actual TM and Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM) concepts. Indeed, the SQM currently in use for GPS L1 C/A was designed using noise-free simulations. The noise is then taken into account in the SQM detector threshold determination. The concept is to ensure that distortions included in ICAO TM are either detected or create a differential error smaller than a limit. This limit was fixed to 3.5m for current GPS L1 C/A airborne receiver.
Using the presented configurations (Table 1) the Threat Space (TS) is defined by fixing ∆ _ regarding civil aviation required performances and the TS is defined fro m this ∆ _ value. This TS includes all signal distortions leading to differential errors higher than ∆ _ for all considered reference/user configurations. With this TS, the range for parameter range is far beyond the one used nowadays for GPS L1 C/A as it will be shown.
To be conservative, in this document, ∆ _ is fixed to 1m. This value grants conservativism compared to the former GPS L1 C/A study, which considers a value of 3.5m. It means that the TM includes all signal deformations (TM-B like) leading to differential error higher than 1m. This choice was made for three reasons: -Future aircraft operations could require an improved positioning accuracy and integrity, with limits below the current value of 3.5m. Consequently, an important margin should be adopted to deal with the dual-frequency configuration. -A natural margin is necessary because the worst case cannot be reached due to the fact that considered user configurations are limited in this document to the ones described in Table 1 , while in reality, they could be infinite. This margin would then be considered as a margin for the error modelling.
Galileo E1C signal (CBOC(6.1)) and GPS L1 C/A Galileo E5a signal (BPSK(10))
reference user Reference user Tracking technique E-L (BOC(1.1) local replica) E-L (BOC(1.1) local replica) E-L (BPSK(10) local replica) E-L (
LOWER LIMIT FOR PARAMETERS AND
In this section, the lower Threat Space bounds are defined: firstly the ringing frequency and then the damping factor . Only the impact of a distortion on a reference receiver is necessary to fix these two limits.
Ringing frequency
It is noticeable that distortions due to low have a strong impact on all receivers including the reference. Figure 1 presents the influence of such signal distortion as a function of the damping factor for Galileo E5a and Galileo E1C signals.
Figure 1. 1MHz (Galileo E1C) and 3MHz (Galileo E5a) EWF consequences on a standalone receiver without applying filtering
These plots indicate that the impact of a 1 MHz for Galileo E1C signal (respectively 3MHz for Galileo E5a) distortion on the reference is higher than 20 meters whatever the value of is. It is also possible to show that the impact is stronger when the frequency is lower. By consequences all frequencies smaller than 1 MHz for Galileo E1C (respectively 3MHz for Galileo E5a) should be detected at the reference station level by the complementary monitor on the absolute bias. Therefore, it seems legitimate to remove these low frequencies from the TM.
Damping factor
Without any consideration, the lowest value of is taken equal to zero. Negative values lead to divergent signals and are not physically conceivable.
UPPER BOUNDS FOR PARAMETERS AND
The highest and damping factor values are estimated in this part. Firstly, the impact of a distortion on a user working with differential corrections is assessed. This consideration permits to limit . Secondly the impact of a distortion on a reference receiver is evaluated in order to limit .
Maximum differential tracking error entailed by second order distortions
The following plots represent the worst differential tracking error for 4 different reference configurations (4 different filters) and 42 user configurations (4 ( ) × 2( ) × 7( ℎ)). The withheld TS is the parameter range leading to differential error higher than ∆ _ = 1 (dark colour area on right plots). Results are presented for Galileo E1C in Figure 2 and Galileo E5a signals in Figure 3 . 1 MHz EWF (Ga lileo E1C) a nd 3MHz EWF (Galileo E5a ) tra cking bias a ffecting a reference s tation functi on of the s igma value.
Galileo E5a Galileo E1c
To have a simple TM definition, it is decided to adopt a rectangular Threat Space. Blue lines represent the TM limits for and low that can be fixed from differential tracking error considerations or that have been fixed in the previous section. However, it is noticeable that a problem appears for high distortions when is low. The limit cannot be fixed for high values and is represented by the red line. Nevertheless it is decided to define a first area which is called area 1 based on the red rectangle visible on Figure 2 and Figure 3 . 
function of representation
Another representation to observe the impact of high on the tracking error is to plot the tracking error for signal distortions in a ( ( )2 ; ) system as shown in Figure 4 . Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the concept of this new representation. Figure 5 gives the differential tracking error applying filter 3 for the user and filter 1 for the reference. It is noteworthy that differential errors can also be large (ie larger than the considered ∆ _
This new ( ( )2 ; ) representation has a lot of interest because it illustrates that the tracking error is (almost) constant for a given ( )2 and high frequencies. One of the consequence is that a constant ( )2 upper limit can estimate an upper limit for distortions of interest based on reference capability to detect large bias .
Consequently it is decided to establish the area 2 upper limit ( ( )2 representation) based on the reference station capability to detect large absolute bias. As introduced previously, it is assumed in this document that the reference minimum detectable bias is equal to 20 meters.
The area 2 lower limit is based on the complementarit y with area 1. To be conservative, for Galileo E1C the lower limit is given by: representation. Indeed, from this ( ( )2 ) the new representation is able to take into account most of the different threatening distortions even for high where less are tested. This is supported by the fact that above this limit, distortions vary slowly as it can be sensed on Figure  5 . It is noticeable that the proposed Threat Space, composed of both area 1 and 2, is wider (by a factor 100) than the GPS L1 C/A Threat Space defined by ICAO. The purpose of this part is to compare the Threat Space in terms of number of tests to consider to take into account all threatening distortions with a fair resolution. In this part, the term resolution is used to represent the capacity of a test to get the most of different distortions as possible in a given TS.
It is not possible to test all threatening distortions because there is an infinity of distortions in a Threat Space. Nevertheless, to work with the current TM, only a finite number of distortions are tested. We define two consecutive tested distortions as two distortions with the same but consecutive values or with the same but two consecutive . To assess losses caused by the quantification of the Threat Space, a parameter is introduced: the tracking error difference observed between two consecutive tested distortions. This parameter is called ∆ _ and is used to evaluate the correlation function shape difference between to tested distortions.
The concept is to consider that only low enough ∆ _ values are tolerable. Indeed, if these values are too large, it means that the quantification of the TS is too large, and that the correlation function shape varies dramatically between two consecutive tested distortions. The consequence is that some threatening distortions could be omitted. It is remarkable that ∆ _ does not reflect exactly the difference of correlation function shape between two tested distortions. To be rigorous, a metric based on all correlation function points should be evaluated. Nevertheless, in this document, only a general idea of the correlation function behavior is necessary to compare TM convenience.
The lower the value of ∆ _ is, the better the resolution is. In order to compare the convenience of the new proposed Threat Space relatively to the ICAO Threat Space used for GPS L1 C/A, the same ∆ _ order of magnitude has to be reached in both Threat Spaces. Due to the fact that the problem is on high values, only the resolution on is studied, it means for a fixed .
The reference for the resolution is based on the GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM. As an example, it is decided to introduce the grid of tested distortions presented in Figure 6 for the ICAO Threat Space: = 4: 1: 17 , = 0.8: 1: 8.8
/ . Figure 6 shows tested values.
Figure 6. Example of a Threat Space grid. (GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM)
In this case 126 tests are realized to cover the Threat Space. For this particular case, ∆ _ values are given Figure  7 . Different curves correspond to the 14 tested . The abscissa gives the mean value of the two consecutive tested values at the origin of the ∆ _ computation. The maximu m ∆ _ obtained with this sampling of the L1 C/A current TS is 2.8m. This is the approximate limit that has to be reached in the worst case for the sampling of the TS for the studied new signals. 
Area 1
Using the same grid for the area 1 of the Galileo E1C signal case, 513 tests are necessary to cover the whole area. This augmentation is due to the fact that higher values of and are considered in area 1 of the proposed TM. Moreover for low frequencies and low values a thinner grid has to be design to reach the same ∆ _ order of magnitude. The proposed grid is presented in Figure 8 and corresponds to 765 tests. The area 1 can be decomposed in three tested zones: -Zone1 to study low . The grid consists on With the grid proposed for the area 1 of Galileo E1C signal, ∆ _ are comparable to values obtained with the grid proposed as an example for the GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM ( Figure 6 ). Consequently, on Galileo E1C area 1 this new grid can be adopted to obtain approximatively the same resolution. The number of tested values is multiplied by a factor 6.1 (≈ 765 126 ⁄ ).
The same principle can be applied on Galileo E5a signal. However, with this signal, it is not necessary to define different zones. One of the consequence is that less tests have to be realized. The proposed grid presented in Figure 12 has been created using the following parameters: It gives that the number of simulations to cover Galileo E5a area 1 has to be multiplied by 1 (≈ 119 126 ⁄ ) compared to the number of simulations necessary to cover the GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM with the same resolution.
Area 2
To these tested distortions , distortions in the area 2 of the TS, have to be added. In this area, with the same mesh ( = 3: 1: 19 , ( ( )2 ) = 0.07: 1: 5 / / / ), ∆ _ are higher for high frequencies because a lot of values are omitted in the ( )2 representation. This is why it is necessary to reduce the mesh in area 2 to reach the same resolution as in area 1. Regarding the Galileo E1C signal, it is decided to use a mesh 20 times thinner for area 2 as illustrated in Figure 14 . The plot on the top corresponds to the Threat Space grid in the ( )2 representation whereas the plot on the bottom is given in the representation. As observed for Galileo E1C, for this grid, ∆ _ have the same order of magnitude than in the GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM case. It means that approximatively the same resolution is obtained if the number of tested values in Galileo E5a area 2 is multiplied by 6.7 (= 840 126 ⁄ ) compared to the number of tests necessary to cover the current ICAO TM.
To conclude, it has been seen in this section that longer simulations are required to cover the wide proposed Threat Model. However to obtain approximatively the resolution with which the Threat model is examined in the GPS L1 C/A ICAO TM case, the number of simulations can be limited to: -13.4 + 6.1 = 19.5 times the number of simulation compared to the actual TM for Galileo E1C. -6.7 + 1 = 7.7 times the number of simulation compared to the actual TM for Galileo E5a.
These two values are reasonable to deal with the problem of signal distortions.
Conclusion about the conservative TM-B
This TM is conservative because it includes all dangerous signal distortions. The problem is that this TM has to take into account very high values. A solution is proposed to limit the number of distortions to test. This solution consists in the separation of the Threat Space in two areas:  Area 1: This area resides on the in ordinate and in abscise. This representation is equivalent to the classical ICAO TM-B distortion representation. This area is necessary to take into account low ( )2 signal distortion behaviors. Based on distortions of the correlation function and their impact on differential user and on the reference ground station, the boundaries of the two areas were identified. An important remark is that Area 2 is dependent on the reference station capability to detect bias. Results given in this document are established for a reference with a minimum detectable bias equal to 20m. If performances of the reference station are better, the area 2 could be smaller. Parameters presented here are fairly conservative.
Table 2. proposed TM-B parameters range for different signals using two representations
It is noticeable that more signal distortions have to be tested in comparison to the actual ICAO GPS L1 C/A TM. Indeed, to run through the proposed TM, the number of tests have to be increased by a factor 20. Figure 6 gives the two areas in the (left plot) and in the 
TM-A DISTORTION (DIGITAL DISTORTION)
As presented in the introduction Threat Model A consists of the normal C/A code signal except that all the positive chips have a falling edge that leads or lags relative to the nominal end-time for that chip.
Threat Model A for GPS L1 C/A has a single parameter , which is the lead ( < 0) or lag ( > 0) expressed in fractions of a chip. The range for this parameter is -0.12 ≤ ≤ 0.12.
In this part, the TM-A is extended to Galileo E5a and Galileo E1C signals. It is recalled that the reasoning developed in this paper is based on the assumption that the same kind of failure appears on GPS L1 C/A, Galileo E1C and Galileo E5a signals.
The extension to the BPSK(10) (Galileo E5a) is simpler than to the CBOC (Galileo E1C) signal. That is why two digital TMs are proposed for the CBOC modulation: one conservative TM and one simplified TM. The simplest remaining CBOC TM-A presented in the last sub-part is based on a strong assumption: the CBOC digital signal is directly generated as the components product.
Galileo E5a
sampling of the correlation function, then the range for should be higher. [7] Regarding the impact on the receiver, the correlator spacing of the E5a tracking pair should be around 1chip whereas on GPS L1 C/A this value is around 0.1chip. values currently in use for the GPS L1 C/A TM-A correspond to a flat zone at the top of the correlation function which is slightly larger than the 0.1chip correlator spacing. The same principle is envisaged for the Galileo E5a case. -When converting in seconds (rather than chip unit), the same order of magnitude should be envisaged.
To be conservative, it is proposed to take: −1.2 5 ℎ ≤ ≤ 1.2 5 ℎ
Galileo E1C
As introduced previously, the CBOC(6,1, 1 11 ⁄ ) signal TM-A is more difficult to design because of the presence of subcarriers. The presence of several components in the signal entails a multiplication of TM-A possibilities. Payload knowledge could help to make choices among the large number of conceivable TM-A. However, the lack of information about a payload miss -functioning prevents the selection. In this section, only most likely digital distortions are presented.
The following scheme presents the Galileo E1 signal generation [8] . Only the bottom part (highlighted green box) is of interest in the E1C component generation. Figure 18 . Galileo E1 signal generation block scheme [8] Digital distortion 1: A lead/lag on every signal fallin g transitions after modulation. It is possible to imagine that only BOC(6,1) or BOC(1,1) transitions are affected by this lead/lag but because the distortion is applied after modulation, it is most likely that a delay will appear on every transitions.
The impact on the signal and on the correlation function of such a signal deformation are shown respectively on the top and on the bottom for = 0.05 ℎ (In blue the undistorted signal, in red the distorted signal):
Figure 19. Impact of the digital distortion 5 on the signal (top), and on the correlation function (bottom).
Digital distortion 2:
A lead/lag on the BOC(1,1) subcarrier or/and on the BOC(6,1) sub-carrier fallin g transitions at the signal square wave generator level (before modulation). This distortion was introduced by Stanford in [1] for BOC(1,1) signal. In Figure 9 , the lag on BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) transitions is similar. To be conservative and take into account most of possible cases, two independents parameters are defined: -11 : the lead/lag parameter on BOC(1,1) sub-carrier component (before modulation).
-61 : the lead/lag parameter on BOC(6,1) sub-carrier component (before modulation).
Figure 20. Impact of the digital distortion 4 on the signal (top), and on the correlation function (bottom).
In red, the signal generation component where the distortion 1 appears and in orange where distortion 2 appears:
Figure 21. Galileo E1C signal generation and digital distortions
Parameters values
Two TM-A are proposed to take into account digital distortions for the new Galileo E1C signal: In the three cases, choosing higher values of doesn't bring any change on the signal. These limits can be considered as physical limitations.
These principles are based on a reasoning without considering several TM-A combinations or simultaneous effect of 11 and 61 . Nevertheless, these limits seem reasonable.
However, it is noticeable that some of these high parameter's distortions can be easily detectable. As it could be done to limit TM-B parameter ranges in the conservative proposed TM-B; parameter ranges could be limited by the reference capability to detect large absolute bias. In this report, it is decided to hold that the reference is able to detect tracking bias larger than 20 meters to define TM-A limits.
Using this condition of 20 meters, and 11 can be decreased to 0.12 chip and 0.10 chip respectively. The reference tracking error function of delta values are presented Figure 12 . Reference configuration was applied to establish these plots. 
), BOC(6,1), PRN) generated independently (TM-A2) or is the digital signal directly generated as the product of the components (TM-A1)?
Here, the assumption is made that the digital signal is directly generated as the components product. It entails that only TM-A1 is conserved.
Proposed TM
TM-A1: A lead/lag ( ) on every signal falling transitions after modulation. Only one parameter is necessary (digital distortion 1). The retained parameter range is: −0.12 ℎ ≤ ≤ 0.12 ℎ
Conclusion on TM-A
Galileo E1c
-TM-A1: lead/lag at every signal falling transitions after modulation: Δ. -TM-A2: lead/lag on the BOC(6,1) ( 61 ) and on the BOC(1,1) ( 11 ) sub-carrier falling transitions at signal square wave generator level: 61 on the BOC(6,1) sub-carrier, 11 on the BOC(1,1) subcarrier. It is noteworthy that all these limits could be reduced if the reference station is able to detect smaller bias than 20 meters.
TM-C
In the current ICAO TM, the TM-C is a TM-A and TM-B combination. Parameter ranges choose for TM-C are smaller than individual parameter ranges for TM-A and TM-B.
To be conservative and without more knowledge, the proposed TM-C takes parameter ranges established for the TM-A and the TM-B.
Proposed parameters are summarized in table 4: Tracking error (meter) sees by a reference station for different delta (Tc) parameters delta 11 delta
